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Derivatives and Systemic Risk:  





In the U.S., as in most countries with well-developed securities markets, derivative 
securities enjoy special protections under insolvency resolution laws. Most creditors are 
“stayed” from enforcing their rights while a firm is in bankruptcy. However, many 
derivatives contracts are exempt from these stays. Furthermore, derivatives enjoy netting 
and close-out, or termination, privileges which are not always available to most other 
creditors. The primary argument used to motivate passage of legislation granting these 
extraordinary protections is that derivatives markets are a major source of systemic risk 
in financial markets and that netting and close-out reduce this risk. To date, these 
assertions have not been subjected to rigorous economic scrutiny. This paper critically re-
examines this hypothesis. These relationships are more complex than often perceived. 
We conclude that it is not clear whether netting, collateral, and/or close-out lead to 
reduced systemic risk, once the impact of these protections on the size and structure of 
the derivatives market has been taken into account. Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout 
 
1. Introduction 
  In recent years, derivatives and some related financial instruments have been 
accorded different legal treatment in insolvency resolution in many countries from other 
creditor claims on firms in bankruptcy.
1 The special treatments which include the ability 
of these contracts to net or setoff offsetting positions between counterparties, to access 
collateral promptly, and to close-out or terminate positions quickly without being subject 
to prolonged legal stays, effectively places these contracts outside the normal bankruptcy 
process applied to other creditors. These exceptions to the usual resolution process are 
important because derivative contracts have expanded significantly in recent years to 
where defaults in these markets are perceived by many to be likely to produce serious 
systemic damage to financial markets and macroeconomies. This systemic risk argument 
has been the major rationale used to justify the enactment of legislation and regulations 
providing these securities with special protections. Indeed, recently enacted bankruptcy 
reform in the U.S. expanded the special provisions to a broader range of instruments and 
contracts, and attempts to do the same are ongoing in other countries. Yet, surprisingly, 
there has been very little rigorous analysis of the economic implications of these 
provisions for netting, collateral, and closeout. Such an analysis is the primary 
contribution of this paper. We conclude that it is not clear whether the netting and 
collateral provisions when combined with closeout,  as is typically the case in derivative 
contracts, decreases the potential for economic damage, as is generally claimed in 
previous work, or indeed increases the risk. 
Both netting (or more generally, set-off) and collateral are legal concepts with long 
histories in commercial and private property law. Legislative and common-law 
developments have perfected these activities with respect to derivative markets and 
                                                 
1 These developments have occurred more or less in parallel in the markets for exchange-traded derivatives, 
(most) OTC derivatives, associated margining and collateral practices, repos, payments systems, and 
securities settlement systems, to name a few. For reasons of expository convenience we shall focus on OTC 
derivatives markets. However, the economic issues involved apply in differing degrees and ways to all of 
these important markets.   2
 payments systems. This process has been international. While cross-jurisdictional 
disparities remain in the treatment of netting and collateral for most contracts, there is 
widespread consistency in the treatment of netting and collateral associated with 
derivative contracts in many jurisdictions. Close-out, which permits the immediate 
termination of contracts under certain conditions, is a more recent concept. Except for 
some minor exceptions (e.g., wages, suppliers) to permit the continued operation of the 
insolvent business, non-bank insolvency resolution procedures are universally based on 
staying claims while the insolvency is being adjudicated.
2 Close-out of covered derivative 
contracts is directly antithetical to the spirit of staying claims and is aimed at protecting 
not the firm in insolvency, but the counterparties to the contracts. 
These legal protections, which place covered contracts outside of the normal 
bankruptcy (or insolvency) resolution process, have been justified by the argument that 
financial derivatives markets are critical to the efficient functioning of financial markets, 
and that close-out netting and collateral protection are necessary to prevent the failure of 
any one or more large firms from being propagated to other firms and markets resulting 
in a systemic breakdown of those institutions. This argument has been made by regulators 
and industry groups and has been cited by legislatures when enabling legislation has been 
discussed. The result has been a regulatory and legislative consensus that strongly 
supports these existing special protections and attempts to expand them further. Indeed, 
the adoption of these protections in many industrialized countries is a notable example of 
successful progress towards international legal harmonization. 
With rare exceptions, the debate on protecting derivative contracts even at 
the expense of placing them outside the normal insolvency processes has been 
remarkably one sided.
3 It is almost universally argued that the inclusion of all 
three provisions in derivatives contracts is necessary to reduce the potential for  
                                                 
2 Stays are handled differently in U.S. bank insolvency procedures. For a discussion of stays and other 
differences between bank and non-bank insolvency regimes see Bliss and Kaufman (2005). 
3 Two important early studies, the “Angell Report” (BIS, 1989) and the “Lamfalussy Report” (BIS, 1990), 
did look at the pros and cons of netting in the context of payments systems, and raised a number of 
concerns, primarily associated with loss shifting and effects of legal uncertainty.    3
systemic risk and severe economic disruptions in financial markets.
4 For example, 
in a summary of the relevant sections of the recently enacted Bankruptcy Act of 
2005, a member of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets 
concluded that:  
“Title IX of the Bankruptcy Act of 2005 is designed to further the 
longstanding goal of the U.S. insolvency laws: reduction of systemic risk. 
The principal method of reducing systemic risk under the Bankruptcy 
Code and the FDI Act is through assuring the availability of close-out 
netting for derivatives.” (Krimminger, 2005)  
However, a number of recent studies have begun to examine the costs associated 
with the protection of derivatives contracts and the validity of the underlying 
systemic-risk-reduction argument.
5   
Notwithstanding the frequent use of the combined term “close-out netting,” close-out 
and netting perform different economic functions, and both are in practice tied to 
collateral. These mechanisms have evolved for purposes other than reducing systemic 
risk reduction. Market participants tend to be more concerned with their own welfare in 
normal day-to-day business environments than with possibilities of adverse externalities 
in the form of systemic failures of markets. Netting, close-out, and collateral serve the 
needs of market participants even when there is no systemic threat: They facilitate market 
risk and counterparty credit risk management; and they permit expansion of dealer 
activities, enhancing the depth and liquidity of the derivatives markets. 
This paper examines netting, close-out, and collateral and the economic functions that 
they perform. While they work together, the three provisions have different though 
frequently overlapping economic effects. The effect of these mechanisms are generally 
analyzed in a static framework; that is by considering, for a given set of contracts, the 
winners and losers vis-à-vis what would obtain if the protections were not in effect. 
                                                 
4 An industry letter to Congress, dated 3 March 2005, supporting expansion of protections was signed by 
the American Bankers Association, the ABA Securities Association, the Bond Market Association, Edison 
Electric Institute, Emerging Markets Traders Association, the Foreign Exchange Committee, the Futures 
Industry Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, the Investment Company Institute, the Managed Funds Association, and the Securities 
Industry Association. Another letter, dated 31 October 2001, asserting that “…failure to enact financial 
contract netting provisions would unnecessarily place the financial system at greater risk.” was signed by 
the heads of the Federal Reserve Board, the Department of the Treasury, the Security and Exchange 
Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision.  
5 See Bergman et al (2003), Bliss (2003), Emmons (2003), Edwards and Morrison (2005).    4
However, as pointed out in Bergman et al (2003), a complete and full economic analysis 
of market mechanisms, such as netting, requires a dynamic analysis that considers how 
market structures and the contracts that firms undertake are affected by the mechanisms. 
Section 2 will provide a brief overview of netting, close-out and collateral as it 
applies to derivatives contracts.
6 Section 3 will analyze the functions these mechanisms 
play in risk management from the perspective of a dealer or active end-user and the effect 
they have had on market structure. Section 4 will re-examine the systemic risk reduction 




In most business relations, netting and set-off are not significant issues. Generally, 
firms either buy from or sell to other firms, but rarely do both simultaneously. So, in the 
event of bankruptcy, few if any contracts could be netted or set-off. However, financial 
markets often generate large numbers of bi-directional transactions between 
counterparties.  
Close-out and netting consist of two separate but related rights, often combined 
into a single contract: 1) the right of a counterparty to unilaterally terminate contracts 
under certain specified conditions (close-out), and 2) the right to offset amounts due at 
termination of individual contracts between the same counterparties when determining 
the final obligation. In the U.S. and some other jurisdictions, the governing contracts 
typically contain terms stipulating the actions to be taken in the event of default. In other 
jurisdictions, such as the UK, a common law netting right exists. 
The wide-spread adoption of laws protecting close-out netting and collateral 
agreements has been shepherded mainly by the International Swap and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), a trade group that coordinates industry documentation practices, 
drafts model contracts, and lobbies for legislative changes to support the enforceability of 
those contracts. Central to the ISDA approach to netting is the concept of a master 
agreement that governs transactions between counterparties. The Master Agreement is 
designed to eliminate legal uncertainties as to terms of the contract and to provide 
                                                 
6 A fuller description may be found in Bliss (2003), Bergman et al (2003), or Johnson (2000). 
7 Portions of this section previously appeared in Bliss (2003).   5
mechanisms for mitigating counterparty credit risk. It specifies the general terms of the 
agreement between counterparties with respect to general questions such as credit support 
arrangements, netting, collateral, definition of default and other termination events, 
calculation of damages (on default), documentation, and so forth. Multiple individual 
transactions are then subsumed under this general Master Agreement forming a single 
legal contract of indefinite term under which the counterparties conduct their mutual 
business. Individual transactions are handled by confirmations that are incorporated by 
reference into the Master Agreement. Placing individual transactions under a single 
master agreement that provides for netting of covered transactions has the effect of 
avoiding any problems netting agreements may encounter under various bankruptcy 
codes. Having only a single contract between each pair of counterparties to a Master 
Agreement eliminates the problem of netting multiple contracts.
8 Netting legislation 
covering derivatives has been adopted in most countries with major financial markets (the 
UK being a notable exception, where netting has long been provided for in the 
bankruptcy code), and ISDA has obtained legal opinions supporting their Master 
Agreements in most relevant jurisdictions. 
 
2.1 Close-out netting 
Close-out netting affects the treatment of outstanding contracts between 
counterparties upon insolvency or other contractually specified adverse credit event. In 
general, close-out netting involves the termination of all contracts between the insolvent 
and a solvent counterparty. Broadly speaking, there are two relevant classes of contracts: 
1) executory contracts are promises to transact in the future (but where no transaction has 
yet occurred), such as a forward agreement to purchase foreign currency; and 2) other 
contracts, such as a loan, where a payment by one party has already occurred. We refer to 
these as “non-executory contracts,” since no single legal description applies. These two 
types of contracts are treated differently under close-out netting.  
                                                 
8In some cases, there may be several Master Agreements covering different classes of contracts and with 
different divisions of the same holding company. Thus, counterparty netting protection may be less than 
complete. This has led to the development of Cross-Product Master Agreements, in effect Master Master 
Agreements. ISDA has lobbied for legislative recognition of these innovations to reflect industry risk 
management practices. Many of these proposed changes have been incorporated into the recently passed 
changes in U.S. bankruptcy laws.   6
Non-executory contracts may contain clauses that permit the creditor to accelerate 
future payments—for instance, repayment of loan principal—in the event of default or 
the occurrence of a stipulated credit event, for example a downgrade by a rating agency. 
Acceleration precedes any netting and determines in part the amounts due. The handling 
of non-executory contracts where payments are due to the insolvent counterparty depends 
on the contract terms and legal jurisdiction. Whereas non-executory contracts may be 
accelerated in insolvency, executory contracts are terminated. Termination cancels the 
contract and creates a claim for compensation, usually the cost of reestablishing the 
contract on identical terms with another solvent counterparty.  
Upon default or a contractually agreed “credit event,”
9 where close-out netting is 
permitted, the value due under the master agreement is determined by marking to market 
the executory contracts and determining the amounts due under accelerated non-
executory contracts. These amounts are then netted and a single net payment is made. If 
the solvent counterparty is a net creditor—is in-the-money—the solvent counterparty 
becomes a general creditor for the net amount. If the solvent counterparty is a net 
debtor—the solvent counterparty is out of the money—the full payment is made to the 
insolvent counterparty or their trustee. Usually, the solvent counterparty determines the 
values of the contracts being terminated and payments owed. These computations may 
subsequently be litigated. However, disputes over the exact valuation do not affect the 
ability of the solvent counterparty to immediately terminate and replace the contracts 
with a different counterparty. 
Acceleration and termination both change the amounts immediately due to and 
from the solvent counterparties vis-à-vis what would have been currently due had the 
credit event (default, downgrade) not occurred. Terminations of contracts with the 
resulting demands for immediate payments may precipitate financial difficulties and even 
insolvency of a firm and make it difficult to resolve the firm in an orderly manner or to 
arrange refinancing.
10 For this reason, many jurisdictions limit the rights of counterparties 
                                                 
9Termination events may include cross defaults (defaulting on other contracts), mergers, changes in legal or 
regulatory status, changes in financial condition, and changes in credit rating (Johnson, 2000). 
10A recent example is the acceleration of some $4 billion of Enron’s debt following its downgrade by rating 
agencies. The firm could not meet the resulting demand for immediate payment of principal and was forced 
to file for bankruptcy. Until that time, Enron had not actually failed to make a payment on any obligation, 
though it was almost surely already insolvent.   7
to enforce the termination clauses in their contracts. The court can impose a stay, which 
does not invalidate termination clauses in contracts but rather overrides them, perhaps 
temporarily, at the discretion of the court. Staying contracts establishes a “time out” 
while keeping the contracts in force; normal payments are still due. This differs from 
cherry picking, which involves the insolvent counterparty disavowing unfavorable 
contracts and forcing the associated solvent counterparties to become general creditors of 
the insolvent firm. 
 
2.2 Collateral 
 Secured  or  collateralized  transactions are common in business—mortgage loans 
and liens are common examples. The use of collateral is however even more pervasive in 
derivatives markets.
11 In insolvency, most collateral remains under the control of the 
bankruptcy trustee, at least initially. While secured creditors may have a claim on 
particular assets, their ability to immediately realize the value of the assets is subject to 
the procedural delays inherent in the bankruptcy process.
12  
  In contrast, in most cases collateral posted against derivatives positions is under 
the control of the counterparty and may be liquidated immediately upon a covered “event 
of default”. This arises both due to operation of laws governing derivatives contracts that 
recognize the right to liquidate collateral, and due to the nature of the collateral used—
cash or securities delivered to the counterparty at the time the collateral is posted, and 
therefore under their immediate control.  
Derivatives collateral is therefore fundamentally different in both type and nature 
from the use of physical assets as security, pledged against other specific debts, but under 
the control of the debtor. Part of the difference in legal treatment is justified by the fact 
that physical assets may be essential to the continued operation of the firm, while cash or 
securities that have already been delivered to a counterparty could not then be 
simultaneously used for other purposes. 
 
                                                 
11 The use of repurchase agreements for short term lending and margin accounts for exchange-traded 
derivatives are related examples of financial market adaptations designed to reduce credit risk through 
secured transactions. 
12 Procedures exist for secured creditors to petition the bankruptcy court to release their security. The rules 
governing such release are complicated and necessarily involve some delay (see, for example, Baird, 2001).   8
3. Risk Management and Market Structure 
A major function of derivatives is to transfer risk from those wishing to lay off a 
particular type of risk to those willing to assume that risk, usually for a price. Netting and 
collateral permit derivatives market participants to reduce the counterparty credit risks 
they are exposed when they enter into a derivatives transaction and thereby expand the 
market. Close-out makes netting and collateral more effective, and thus leads to further 
expansion of the market. 
 
3.1 Netting 
Of the three risk reduction mechanisms—netting, collateral, and close-out—
netting has had the greatest impact on the structure of the derivatives markets. Without 
netting the current large size, liquidity and concentration we see in the derivatives 
markets would be unlikely to exist. 
Netting under master agreements of all the covered contracts to determine the 
counterparty risk exposure has a multitude of complex economic implications. Netting 
permits existing risk exposure positions to be adjusted by taking on offsetting contracts 
with the same counterparty. Since new contracts are usually initiated at zero value, this 
means that positions can be adjusted without either party incurring immediate cash flows. 
It also eliminates the need to negotiate the termination value of existing contracts. OTC 
derivatives are generally not tradable. In the absence of netting, a firm that wishes to 
discontinue a derivatives contract would be in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis its 
original counterparty.
13 If it wished to buy out (or sell) its position, it would be in a 
relatively weak bargaining position. If it obtained an offsetting position from another 
market participant, it may have to post collateral with both counterparties, and its own 
credit risk exposure to those counterparties would have increased. With netting and the 
offsetting position being undertaken with the original counterparty, both the (no longer 
desired) market risk and the counterparty credit risk would have been eliminated, and 
associated collateral would have been freed up. 
                                                 
13 For example, consider a firm that had issued a long term floating rate loan and entered into a long term 
swap to swap out the floating rate for a fixed rate. If for some reason (e.g. to lock in subsequent lower long 
term fixed rates) the original variable rate loan is retired, the original swap becomes an unhedged source of 
interest rate risk.   9
By combining two offsetting contracts under the same master agreement, the 
firm’s counterparty would have to manage only the net position. Since the new position is 
usually established at zero value and since subsequent changes in value of the original 
and the offsetting positions would tend to cancel out, the adjustment in positions could be 
undertaken with little or no impact on the credit risk exposures between the parties. Of 
course, the offsetting position could be initiated with another counterparty to achieve the 
same adjustment in market risk exposures. However, in that case each of the 
counterparties with which the firm had positions would have to take measures to control 
the credit risk exposure it had to the firm, resulting in an increase in credit risk exposure 
(no change at original counterparty, but the new counterparty has new credit risk) with 
concomitant increases in costs (collateral or spreads). 
The advantages of dealing with the same counterparty, rather than new 
counterparties, when unwinding hedges extends to establishing multiple positions with 
different risk exposures. Suppose an end-user firm wants both interest rate and foreign 
exchange hedges and that these are imperfectly correlated. By obtaining the hedges from 
the same counterparty, the future credit risks that will be generated as the hedge position 
values fluctuate will be reduced through the diversification of market risk exposures. The 
end user might then obtain more favorable terms (spreads) and/or reduced collateral 
requirements, reducing its costs of hedging. 
These benefits of dealing with a single counterparty to reduce the cost of 
(effectively) unwinding hedges through offsetting positions and for hedging multiple 
exposures leads to economies of scale. End users also have incentives to deal with one 
counterparty rather than many and thus tend to use dealers. Given these benefits, and 
reduced search costs and reduction in information asymmetries that established 
relationships produce, OTC derivatives have evolved into a market dominated by 
financial intermediaries, referred to as dealers,
14 who function as common counterparties 
to large numbers of end users. These derivatives dealers also actively trade with each 
other to manage their positions. 
                                                 
14 These are not dealers in the sense of buying and selling contracts (since most OTC derivatives are not 
traded), nor are they brokers who facilitate trades between counterparties without taking possession of the 
contract being traded. Rather they are derivatives portfolio managers who dynamically manage large books, 
deriving income from bid-offer spreads, while seeking to remain “market neutral” by appropriately 
controlling their exposures. Nonetheless, the term “dealer” is generally applied to these intermediaries.   10
However, the scope of the dealer market model is constrained by capital. Market 
and credit risk exposures must either be hedged or collateral must be posted against 
potential losses. In addition, financial firms must hold capital against their credit 
exposures. The amount of needed capital may be determined by internal prudential 
judgment, external market forces (market discipline), and/or regulation. A dealer can 
manage market risk exposures by ensuring a balanced book (taking offsetting positions 
with different counterparties). This is more easily done if the dealer operates on a large 
scale. However, operating on a larger scale means greater credit risk, and it is here that 
position netting under master agreements becomes critically important. If it was not 
possible to net exposures to each counterparty, then total credit risk exposures would 
grow proportionally with the gross size of the dealer’s book. Aggregated across dealers 
(and other market participants), the credit risk exposures would grow proportionally with 
the size of the market as a whole. Credit risk exposures need to be managed either 
through capital set asides or through collateral arrangements. Since equity capital is 
widely perceived to be expensive and collateral is scarce, the effect would be to constrain 
both the size of the market and the size of dealer firms in the market. 
An additional implication of position netting is the effect it has on incentives of 
parties to react to perceptions of increasing credit risk of their counterparties. Were credit 
exposures related to gross positions, all counterparties of a troubled firm would have 
strong incentives to terminate their existing positions (if possible), cease initiating new 
additional positions, and decline to roll over maturing positions. Since derivatives are an 
important tool of risk management, this exclusion of troubled firms from the market 
could further exacerbate their financial problems.  With position netting, however, the 
out-of-the-money counterparties of a troubled firm have little immediate incentive to 
terminate their relationship,
15 and in-the-money counterparties have reduced incentives to 
terminate their relationship, particularly if the troubled firm could post collateral to cover 
the net position. Thus, netting reduces the incentives for derivatives counterparties to 
“run” and hence makes workouts of temporarily troubled firms more likely. 
                                                 
15 One reason that an out-of-the-money counterparty might be concerned arises from the possibly that if the 
markets prices underlying their positions move in the future their positions could become in-the-money, 
with concomitant credit risk as to the net exposure.   11
Position netting permits the size of the credit risk exposures to grow at less than 
the growth rate of the market as a whole. By holding capital against net rather than gross 
credit risk exposures, dealers can build a bigger book on a given capital base. They can 
also expand the (gross) positions they undertake vis-à-vis a given counterparty who has a 
given capital base or a given quantity of good collateral. As derivative markets have 
expanded and become more concentrated, the reduction of credit risk exposures through 
netting has risen. Figure 1 shows the increasing degree of netting of credit exposures by 
U.S. banks.
16 Bilateral netting have risen from 45 percent in 1996-Q1 to 83 percent in 
2004-Q4.  
Thus, the benefits to end-users of dealing with fewer counterparties, the apparent 
economies of scale and scope provided by running a large dealer book, and the ability to 
expand gross positions has made position netting a prime factor in the rapid expansion of 
derivatives markets.
17 But it has also led to the concentration of that market in a relatively 
few large international dealers. Figure 2 show the percentage of the bank derivatives 
market accounted for by the largest dealers over time.
18 In parallel to the increasing 
reliance on netting to reduce credit exposures, a handful of the very largest dealers have 
accounted for an increasing portion of the derivatives market.
19 Both the size and 
concentration of markets are sources of liquidity.  
 
3.2 Collateral 
  Managing net credit exposures to individual counterparties depends either on 
limiting (gross) exposures or on the business needs of the counterparty generating a 
demand for offsetting positions. Both of these have limitations. Early in the development 
of the derivatives markets, there was a tendency to deal only with the most credit worthy 
                                                 
16 Quarterly survey of US banks (OCC, 2004).These numbers are dominated by the largest US derivatives 
dealer banks: the top 3(10) banks account for 88.8(98.1) percent of all US bank derivatives positions. 
Comparable numbers for other (non-US commercial bank) derivatives dealers are not available, but these 
numbers are likely to be representative. 
17 In the absence of obvious barriers to entry, the dominance of the dealer market by a few very large firms 
suggests that economies of scale and scope are present. 
18 This data is derived from current and past OCC Bank Derivatives Reports (e.g. OCC, 2004) and thus is 
limited to U.S. bank derivatives positions. Again it is likely to be representative of derivatives dealers n 
general, though comprehensive non-bank data is not available. 
19 This may be due to mergers of derivatives dealers, resulting in consolidation of both derivatives books 
and their associated capital backing, or due to expansion of derivatives dealing through increased on a fixed 
capital base, or a combination of these two factors.   12
counterparties. Less credit-worthy counterparties were either excluded entirely or paid 
substantial premia. Financial institutions set up AAA-rated bankruptcy-remote 
subsidiaries to handle their derivatives dealing operations. 
  The use of collateral has enabled the further mitigation of credit risk and the 
expansion of the market to include less credit-worthy counterparties. At the same time, 
use of collateral as a credit risk mitigation mechanism has expanded along with the 
aforementioned expansion of netting. ISDA (2004a) reports that at the beginning of 2004, 
50 percent of master agreements
20 were covered by collateral arrangements, up from 30 
percent in 2003. Total collateral pledged against derivatives master agreements in 2004 
was just over $1 trillion,
21 up 40 percent from the previous year. ISDA reports that this 
growth reflects a continuing growth in the use of derivatives together with the increasing 
use of collateral agreements. Thus, counterparty credit exposures are first reduced 
through netting and the remaining net exposures are further by the pledging of collateral. 
This reduces the total exposures by near 93 percent. 
The large majority of the collateral is cash (79 percent; 51 percent in USD, 23 
percent in EUR).
22 Government securities account for 16 percent of collateral used. The 
large usage of cash means that collateral is both liquid and not subject to large 
fluctuations in value. 
The major reason cited by ISDA for the use of collateral agreements is the 
reduction of economic capital and credit risk. Freeing up lines of credit, permitting 
further trading with individual counterparties, was also a major motivation. All contribute 
to growth of the derivatives market.  
 
3.3 Close-Out 
Close-out permits derivatives market participants to freeze their exposures in the 
event of the failure of a counterparty or other event of default stipulated in their master 
agreement. Without the ability to close-out their positions at the time a counterparty 
becomes insolvent, market participants would find themselves locked into contracts that 
                                                 
20 The numbers are similar for both number of trades and market value exposure basis. 
21 Collateral frequently is re-hypothecated, that is collateral received from one counterparty is then used to 
satisfy demands for collateral by another counterparty. The ISDA estimates of collateral usage (gross 
values) account for this effect. 
22 ISDA (2004b).   13
fluctuate in value. This may be true of many other contracts with the bankrupt firm. 
However, in the case of derivatives, unlike for instance a bond, the derivatives position is 
likely to require constant rebalancing to maintain hedged positions.  
Netted positions are inherently more volatile than their underlying gross positions, 
and require continuous monitoring and management. For example, a one percent change 
in the value of gross in-the-money contracts, assuming the value of the offsetting out-of-
the-money contracts remains unchanged, would result in a tenfold change in the value of 
the net position if the gross exposures were ten times as large as the net. Collateral posted 
against current net positions must therefore be adjusted more frequently than if netting 
was not permitted and gross exposures were collateralized.
23 When a counterparty 
becomes insolvent, and positions are frozen, the solvent counterparty’s net position can 
deteriorate more rapidly than the underlying gross positions and prompt close-out is 
critical. 
This is particularly true if the ratio of gross exposures to net gross exposures is 
large. Fluctuations in the underlying risks of the derivatives contracts, for instance 
changes in market interest rates, can rapidly change the values of the component gross 
positions and thus the net exposure of the solvent counterparty. Bankruptcy proceedings 
usually take a long and unpredictable time.
24 During the insolvency resolution 
proceeding, the ability of counterparties to manage their exposures to the bankrupt firm 
by entering into new off-setting contracts or by having the firm post additional collateral 
is severely restricted. Thus, if derivatives counterparties were subject to stays in the event 
of insolvency their own risk exposures would be subject to fluctuations that would likely 
be greater than they would experience if neither party was insolvent and both parties 
could dynamically manage their exposures. Furthermore, collateral which had been 
posted against net positions that existed at the time of insolvency would effectively 
become useless if it were frozen, the existing contracts stayed, and the net exposure that 
the collateral was intended to protect allowed to fluctuate beyond the control of the 
solvent counterparty. On the other hand, a creditor who holds an insolvent firm’s debt has 
                                                 
23 The same issue applies to capital, regulatory or economic, being allocated to cover unexpected losses to 
these exposures. Where capital is held against exposures after both netting and collateral (in the case of 
partial collateralization of exposures) the effect is a further increase in sensitivity of the exposure vis-à-vis 
the underlying gross risks. 
24 See Franks and Torous (1988) and Bris et al. (2004).   14
a known exposure, and while the eventual recovery is uncertain, it can be estimated and 
is capped. 
It follows that, while netting and collateral both contribute to the problem of 
position volatility and the need to actively manage positions to ensure that collateral 
remains adequate to cover credit losses in the event of counterparty default. without the 
means of locking in the values of positions at the time of insolvency (i.e., close-out), 
netting and collateral alone would be impotent mechanisms for credit risk mitigation.
25  
Close-out serves another purpose. It reduces the uncertainty that the 
counterparties face with respect to their own hedges. If a fully hedged solvent 
counterparty were stayed from closing out and instead was locked into a derivatives 
contract with an insolvent counterparty, the solvent counterparty would not know 
whether it was hedged or not. Even if the insolvent counterparty eventually makes good 
on its contracts, the solvent counterparty would still face problems of matching on-going 
cash flows during the bankruptcy process (unless the bankruptcy administrator permitted 
payment on existing contracts). If markets move against the solvent counterparty, they 
would face losses if the insolvent counterparty eventually defaulted on its contracts. If, on 
the other hand, the solvent counterparty sought to rehedge with another solvent 
counterparty, the existing contracts with the insolvent counterparty would remain in force 
creating an unhedged risk in the event (and to the extent) that the prior contract did in fact 
pay off. The heart of this dilemma is that, in the absence of close-out, the bankruptcy 
process delays resolution of these issues, and the solvent counterparty cannot know ex 
ante what course of action to take. 
A number of alternatives to close-out could conceivably eliminate the problems 
facing the solvent counterparties of an insolvent firm. The insolvency administrators 
could simply sell the derivatives book of the insolvent firm to a new solvent counterparty. 
But this may involve having to sell the book at below (normal) market value, incurring 
fire-sale losses which would be transfer to other creditors. If the intent of the insolvency 
proceeding is to accomplish a workout rather than a liquidation, selling the book would 
                                                 
25 This is of course true for any secured claim in bankruptcy, the difference is that in most situations the 
volatility is related to only the gross value of positions (say the value of a mortgage).   15
leave the distressed firm unhedged and therefore at greater financial risk—but so would 
close-out. 
An alternative that would permit the insolvent firm to remain hedged is simply for 
the insolvency administrator to guarantee the contracts. However, guaranteeing the 
existing contracts is only a partial solution as both the solvent and insolvent 
counterparties would need to manage their positions on an ongoing basis. Thus, the 
insolvency administrator would need to permit and guarantee new contracts entered into 
for purposes of managing the pre-existing exposure and to provide additional collateral 
when needed. This is similar in principal to the continuing payment of wages and 
suppliers during a Chapter 11 proceeding or to debtor in possession financing. However, 
no legal basis exists for such a reprioritization of claims or the transfer of good assets 
(new collateral) to the benefit of derivatives counterparties and to the disadvantage of 
other creditors. The guaranteeing of derivatives contracts may also fail due to the lack of 
availability of good collateral, which an insolvent firm is not likely to have in abundance. 
However, expectations on the part of market participants that contracts will be guaranteed 
may lead to morale hazard, excessive risk taking, and reduced market monitoring 
(Bergman et al, 2004). 
In an effort to ameliorate the moral hazard attendant to guaranteeing derivatives 
contracts, Kaufman (2003a) has proposed that close-out be stayed and that derivatives 
books be transferred to new, solvent counterparties. To eliminate the moral hazard, he 
proposes that original counterparties (of the insolvent firm) with net in-the-money 
positions be required to pay an amount equal to their net exposure multiplied by an 
estimate of the loss rate that would eventually accrued to general creditors.
26  
 
4. The Systemic Risk Reduction Argument 
While netting and collateral have benefited derivatives market in general and 
close-out is integral to making netting and collateral effective, these are not the 
arguments that have been advanced to justify legislation to grant these rights. As noted 
                                                 
26 Such involuntary transfers are permitted under U.S. bank insolvency law, but not under the Bankruptcy 
code. The assessment for expected losses is not possible under current law for non-banks, though it may be 
possible through regulatory action to impose such as stipulation in the contracts entered into by insured 
depository institutions.   16
earlier, what has primarily motivated the widespread adoption of close-out netting and 
collateral protection of derivatives contracts is the argument that doing so reduces 
systemic risk. 
No single generally-agreed definition of what constitutes systemic risk exists.
27 
One common scenario is the failure of one firm triggering the failure of another firm 
which triggers other failures and so on—a chain reaction or domino effect of sequential 
failures. An alternative scenario involves a large macroeconomic shock—say a currency 
devaluation—increasing the perceived or real probability of failure of a number of firms 
leading to a liquidity crunch as informational asymmetries and concerns about asset 
values and counterparty solvency cause participants to sharply reduce trading. A third 
scenario has widespread credit risk exposures to a common large institution that fails 
with losses to many of the exposed counterparties. 
While much of the discussion of systemic risk envisions failures of financial firms 
(propagating or simultaneous), losses or threats of losses short of failure can also cause 
adverse market reactions. Widespread losses to banks may cause them to contract credit 
with adverse macro-economic consequences. Heightened perceptions of risk and 
concomitant flight to quality may also disrupt securities markets and lead to a contraction 
of liquidity. Defensive measures such as increasing collateral requirements and attendant 
liquidation of assets and contraction of positions can lead to further losses.
28 In analyzing 
the systemic risk argument, we will consider each of the three potential types of market 
disruption: cascading failures, large macro-economic shocks, and common-shock market 
disruption/liquidity contraction. 
While there is little evidence of chain reaction failures, there is nonetheless 
considerable public and regulatory concern that these might occur in the future. Liquidity 
and credit crunches are, however, rather more common—the Asian and Russian debt 
                                                 
27 See Kaufman and Scott (2003b) for a discussion. 
28 A distinction may be made between systemic events propagating through the credit channels as banks 
contract credit (whether due to realized losses or due to perceived risks) and propagation through the 
financial (securities) markets with disruption of the ability of (particularly financial) firms to manage their 
risk exposures producing attendant losses (which may have wider economic implications). Borio (2004) 
presents a detailed analysis of several recent episodes financial market distress, the endogenous nature of 
liquidity risk, the role of market structure, and a framework for thinking about policy responses.   17
crises is examples, and concerns about market liquidity motivated the New York Fed’s 
facilitation of the LTCM workout.
29 
Proponents of legal protection of close-out netting for derivative master 
agreements and related collateral protection argue that 1) derivatives markets are 
especially critical to the smooth functioning of the financial system, so that their 
operation deserves special protection, 2) derivatives markets are particularly susceptible 
to systemic failures due to the volatile nature of the value of derivatives contracts, and 3) 
close-out netting and collateral protection ameliorate these risks and so are justified on 
public policy grounds, regardless of the costs (which are rarely mentioned) to other 
market participants and creditors of a failed institution.
30 While this line of reasoning has 
been made so often and with so little contradiction that it has nearly become a truism, it 
does not appear quite so clear cut upon deeper scrutiny. 
Edwards and Morrison (2005) have pointed out one flaw: that because the failure 
of a small derivatives market participant is unlikely to have any systemic consequences 
whether through knock-on failures of its counterparties or by leading to a liquidity 
crunch, the systemic risk argument cannot be used to justify a blanket protection of all 
market participants however small. That said, it may be difficult, as a practical matter, to 
base laws on the size of the effected firms. So the systemic risk argument basically relies 
on both the explicit proposition that the potential failure of the largest derivatives market 
participants poses a systemic risk, and the implicit position that a blanket protection of all 
contracts is the most effective means of reducing the risk posed to/by the few 
systemically important market participants. 
 Attempts to find evidence of chain-reaction systemic risks have suggested that 
this risk is remote (see Kaufman, 1994, and Furfine, 2002 & 2003). However, a case can 
be made that the derivatives markets are exceptionally vulnerable to systemic failures. 
The dealer market is highly concentrated (vide supra). Furthermore, a large fraction of  
                                                 
29 President’s Working Group (1999) noted concerns that failure of LTCM would likely have resulted in 
severe market disruptions and significant losses to direct counterparties and other market participants. 
However, the estimated losses to direct counterparties would not have threatened their individual solvency. 
30 Bergman et al (2004) explore the possible downsides to other market participants, that is those whose 
contracts are not protected by netting agreements (i.e. unsecured creditors), and possible detrimental effects 
on incentives. These possibilities include loss shifting, risk shifting, reduction in market discipline, and lack 
of transparency.    18
derivatives positions are in the inter-dealer market; non-financial end-users account for 
only a small fractions of positions.
31 Removal of any one dealer may seriously disrupt the 
derivatives markets. Even if no knock-on failures occurred, a very large number of 
contracts would need to be replaced and new working relationships would need to be 
established for end users. Liquidation of non-cash collateral and the liquidation of assets 
to post cash collateral could also depress asset values potentially impacting the solvency 
of other institutions. 
Before considering whether close-out netting and collateral protection ameliorate 
these risks, it is worth pointing out that these risks largely exist because close-out netting 
and collateral are protected. Without these protections, the concentrations we see in the 
dealer market which give rise to systemic concerns simply would likely not exist. The 
capital available to support gross credit risk exposures would far exceed to capital 
currently needed to support net exposures. Increasing the capital required to engage in 
derivatives dealing by a factor of 10 or more would materially alter the economics of 
derivatives markets.  
Because dealer concentration appears to be in part an artifact of close-out netting 
and collateral protection, a relevant question is whether close-out netting and collateral 
protection also ameliorate the risks posed by this concentration. An ISDA study (ISDA, 
2004b) of major derivatives dealers found that their net exposures to their five largest 
dealer counterparties averaged 14.5 percent of their total bilateral netted exposures to all 
counterparties.
32 After adjusting for collateral, this fell to 1.15 percent. Based on this 
evidence it is unlikely that the failure of any one dealer would directly result in the failure 
of any other dealer. This risk reduction is due to netting and collateral, rather than 
directly from close-out. The effects of close-out cannot be addressed by the ISDA study.  
                                                 
31 The Bank for International Settlements in its survey of OTC derivatives market activity (BIS, 2003) 
estimated total market value of gross OTC interest rate derivatives positions at  4,328 billion USD in 2003-
H2 (interest rate derivatives account for 62 percent of all derivatives by market value). Of these, 1,872 
billion (43 percent) were inter-dealer positions and only 687 billion USD (16 percent) were with non-
financial customers. 
32 While inter-dealer exposures account for a small fraction of total credit exposures, these exposures are 
with the relatively small number of other dealers and hence may be expected to be large in absolute terms. 
The remaining exposures, those with end-users are in most instances individually small and diversified, 
though a sufficiently large common shock event may still be problematical. A few end users, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, may be sufficiently large to pose undiversified risks to dealers. The ISDA report does not 
detail the degree of end-user credit risk reduction through the use of collateral.   19
Questions as to the disruption and the concomitant costs that the failure of a major dealer 
would cause to the market as a whole also remain open. It is likely that such effects 
would be proportional to the gross numbers of positions or counterparty relations that 
would need to be replaced, and the total collateral pledged by the failing institution that 
would need to be liquidated, rather than to the netted value of the positions at each of the 
counterparties.  
   The effect of close-out on systemic risk is complicated. Edwards and Morrison 
(2005) point out that it depends in part on who is failing. If the failing counterparty is not 
a systemically important firm in its own right and failure is idiosyncratic, the ability of 
counterparties to close-out and reestablish their positions is likely to quickly remove 
latent uncertainties as to the solvency of other counterparties and to more quickly return 
the market to normal operation. When a small firm fails, close-out clears the air.  
However, when a large firm becomes distressed, collateral calls related to its 
deteriorating financial position can potentially push the firm further into distress as the 
firm liquidates assets to meet collateral calls, suffering fire-sale losses in the process.
33 
Eventually the troubled firm will not be able to meet collateral calls and the close-out 
process will be triggered. Cross-default provisions in master agreements virtually ensure 
that when one counterparty’s demand for collateral is not met, all counterparties will 
close out.
34 Close-out leaves a firm unhedged and if the positions are collateralized, strips 
the firm of good assets. Even if the firm is technically solvent (or not yet declared 
insolvent by the appropriate authority), the close-out process can nonetheless harm the 
economic viability of the firm. This process could effectively pre-empt efforts by 
bankruptcy courts or regulators to manage the insolvency, avoid fire-sale of assets, and 
perhaps restore the distressed firm to viability, preserving its going-concern value, and, in 
the case of a large firm, spilling over to other firms and markets. Thus, close-out and 
collateral protection (though not netting) could prove a source of systemic risk by making 
it more difficult to avoid the failure of a distressed by still viable major dealer. 
 
                                                 
33 See Bliss (2003) and Edwards and Morrison (2005). 
34 Cross-default provisions stipulate that default on any contract, even with a different counterparty is an 
event of default under the contract containing the cross-default provision.   20
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Netting and collateral enhance the management of counterparty risk in derivatives 
markets and lead to increased liquidity and depth of these markets. The benefits are 
transferred to the end users in the form of lower costs and greater liquidity for hedge 
instruments, which facilitate their ability to manage market risks. 
However, close-out which is integral to the functioning of netting and collateral 
protections, introduces potential instability in these markets. Although reduction in 
systemic risk is often used as an argument for netting, collateral protection, and close-out, 
the relation between these special protections and systemic risk is complex. Netting and 
collateral may both increase or decrease systemic risk. They may increase it by 
permitting the concentration of dealers. They may reduce it by providing dealers with a 
means of managing their counterparty risks, thus reducing the chances of knock-on 
failures. Close-out, however, is potentially a source of systemic risk by making it more 
difficult to manage the distress or insolvency of a major dealer more. Furthermore, while 
netting and collateral currently ensure that the failure of one dealer is unlikely to directly 
cause the failure of other dealers, these protections do little to ameliorate the disruptions 
to markets that would ensue from abrupt termination of a large number of contracts with 
attendant fire-sale losses from liquidating collateral and the need to reestablish hedges 
with new counterparties. Whether or not these disruptions indirectly lead to other failures, 
they are likely to be costly. 
Unfortunately, it may be difficult, under current law and regulatory norms, to gain 
the benefits that netting and collateral provide, without also having the potential 
disadvantages that close-out may entail. No easy alternative to close-out is available, 
except for the moral hazard-laden transferring of books to solvent counterparties (which 
may not be feasible for insolvencies handled by slow acting courts).  
One alternative proposed by Bliss (2004) and implemented in the case of LTCM 
is for regulators to intervene to facilitate a workout before close-out is triggered. This 
unfortunately requires a degree of monitoring that is not always present to ensure the 
intervention precedes insolvency, and the voluntary co-operation of the relevant 
counterparties. Such interventions on a regular and predictable basis may also create   21
expectations that undermine market discipline and, if unsuccessful, may raise claims 
against the regulator for bail outs. 
We conclude that the systemic risk reduction claims often made for close-out 
netting and collateral protection appear at a minimum to have been over stated. Systemic 
risk is in part made more likely as a result of these protections, but then so also are the 
benefits obtained from a more efficient market that is based on these same protections. 
The combined use of these three provisions represent a two-edged sword that cuts both 
ways. 
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